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AbstractHow do women gain authority in the public sphere, especially in contexts where patriarchal norms are prevalent? I argue that the leaders of patriarchal social movements face pragmatic incentives to expand women's authority roles when seeking new movement members. Women authorities help patriarchal movements by making persuasive, identity‐based arguments in favor of patriarchy that men cannot, and by reaching new audiences that men cannot. I support this argument by examining the rise of online female preachers in the Islamist Salafi movement, using interviews, Twitter analysis, and automated text analysis of 21,000 texts by 172 men and 43 women on the Salafi‐oriented website saaid.net. To show the theory's generality, I also apply it to the contemporary white nationalist movement in the United States. The findings illustrate how movements that aggressively enforce traditional gender roles for participants can nevertheless increase female authority for pragmatic political reasons.

This article (a) reviews parts of the general literature on internal and external whistleblowing, (b) reviews parts of the national security whistleblowing literature and context, (c) discusses theoretical and legal reasons for considering whistleblowing as a countervailing ethics method, (d) discusses problems with the current national security internal whistleblowing system, (e) proposes developmental changes and reforms, (f) considers why potential reforms might reduce the need for ethically and legally problematic external whistleblowing, and (g) concludes that if reforms are not made, which may be likely, then what the Founders of the U.S. Constitution referred to as "unauthorized disclosures [external whistleblowing]" and even strengthened First Amendment protections remain necessary.

Abstract. In the aggregate, within industries and within non‐socialist countries, the market presence of State‐owned businesses is large and growing. Such concerns accounted for 15 percent of world trade in 1979 and they produced 70 percent of world oil production, 40 percent of world iron and bauxite and they accounted for 40 percent of the world's banking assets. Certain governments tend to accord them competitive advantages. Reasons given for doing so range from the belief that they foster economic growth and employment, that they equalize the domestic businesses' power to compete with big multinational companies, that they make national planning possible, to the idea that government favor should not go to benefit private owners, even domestic ones, and that the country, rather than the corporation, is the relevant unit of competition.

Abstract. In three studies responses of high and low fatalists to five different types of communications messages were compared. The five types of information considered were single reward, multiple reward, reward explanations, conformity, and nonsense information. Nutritional, political, and reading behaviors were considered. Two field experiments were conducted with male heads of households and a laboratory experiment was conducted with students. The high fatalists were motivated by reward explanation information. The low fatalists were motivated by single and multiple reward information more than the high fatalists. Responses of the high and low fatalists converged, at the highest motivation level, in response to reward explanation information. Fatalism accounted for more response variance than income, education, or race characteristics. The social significance of these findings is discussed in terms of: the need to motivate the high fatalists; who the high fatalists are; the growth of high fatalism; and the transferability of this paper's communication content findings to organizations dealing with problems of high fatalism.

Three experiments support the inference that powerlessness affects sensitivity to content more than do demographics, e.g. the powerless are more sensitive to content that explains than to content promising reward.